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Computer malwares are major threats that always find a way to penetrate the network,
posing threats to the confidentiality, integrity and the availability of data. Network-borne
malwares penetrate networks by exploiting vulnerabilities in networks and systems. IT
administrators in campus wide network continue to look for security control solutions to
reduce exposure and magnitude of potential threats. However, with multi-user computers
and distributed systems, the campus wide network often becomes a breeding ground for
botnets. We present our work that applies the network forensic techniques via Darknet im-
plementation for passive detection of malware infected computers; primarily botnets, in a
campus wide network. Verification activities were conducted on the infected hosts. This
work analyses the effectiveness of network forensics capability and the accurate detection
of malicious traffic. An accurate detection of malware-infected host enables enforcement
of security policies through isolation of hosts and eventually will enhance network per-
formance. Alongside presenting various aspects of our work, some recommendation are
proposed for preventive measurements to avoid further propagation of bots and network-
borne malwares within campus wide network.
4.1 Introduction
Network is now pervasive and a critical entity in our every day working and learning
environment. Despite increasing devices being connected to the TCP/IP network such as
mobile phones, GPS, and iPads, personal computers are current main targets of exploits,
primarily for malware and bot infection and propagation. The infection of personal comput-
ers with malware can compromise confidentiality, integrity and availability of information
as well as take up unnecessary bandwidth.
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Network forensics is the use of scientifically proven techniques to collect, fuse, iden-
tify, examine, correlate, analyze, and document digital evidence from multiple, actively
processing and transmitting digital sources for the purpose of uncovering facts related to
the planned intent, or measured success of unauthorized activities meant to disrupt, cor-
rupt, and or compromise system components as well as providing information to assist in
response to orrecovery from these activities [1]. In order to capture network activities for
analysis, a sensor is deployed in the network. The type of sensor and its location in the
network influence the traffic being captured. Darknet [2] sensor is one of the available
methods that is used and described in this chapter.
Network forensics can detect mainly two types of malwares – worms and botnet. Worm
is a kind of malware that propagates via network; by network scanning and self-replicating
email. Botnet is a collection of software robots, or in short termed ‘bots’, that run au-
tonomously and automatically. The term botnet [3, 4] can also be used to refer to any
group of bots, such as IRC bots (Internet Relay Chat bots). In general, botnet refers to a
collection of compromised computers, or Zombie computers that receive instructions from
command and control (C&C) servers. The command-and-control can take place via IRC
server or a specific channel on a public IRC network, http, DNS and peer-to-peer appli-
cation. The communication is encrypted for stealth and protection against detection and
intrusion into the botnet network.
The chapter discusses on network forensics via implementation of Darknet and the
sensors as an effort to detect computers that are infected with bots in campus wide network.
A more interactive system implementation involving capturing of malware is outside the
scope of this work.
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows: Section 4.2 describes the background of
the work, Section 4.3, presents the motivation for this work along with the related works.
Section 4.4 talks about our approach used in carrying out this project. Section 4.5 presents
the acquired results of our research implementation. We also discuss the possible coun-
termeasures and recommend some steps to deal with the issues. And finally, Section 4.6
concludes the paper with some remarks about the outcome of the work.
4.2 Background
The key mechanism for bot propagation is via worm behaviour, which is network borne.
It is noted that bots may also spread via email spam, web page drive-by affect and mo-
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bile storage media. Botnets usually gain new victims through network scanning to detect
available vulnerable systems and remotely exploiting the vulnerabilities of systems and
applications running on networked host. Botnets borrow infection strategies from several
classes of malware, including self-replicating wormsande-mail viruses, among others [5].
Once infected; a script (known as shell code) is executed which connects to another bot at
a specified location which hosts malware binaries and fetches the actual bot binary. Upon
completion of the download, the bot binary installs itself to the target machine so that it
starts automatically each time the victim is rebooted. Figure 4.1 illustrates the botnet’s
lifecycle [6].
Fig. 4.1 Lifecycle of Botnet
4.3 Motivation and Related Works
Industry analysts estimate that about 5% to 10% of all PCs are infected with sophis-
ticated, remotely controlled malware. The current defences of layering firewall, Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS) and anti-virus are ineffective in stopping advanced malware, zero-
day and targeted attacks once it enters into the network [7]. Network Intrusion Detection
System (NIDS) conducts passive has evolved into IPS, and the detection technique, very
much depends on the signature had matched a known exploit or having to know the vulner-
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abilities. Both these aspects require a challenging effort in keeping up with the exponential
growth of exploit signature and vulnerabilities.
A similar approach of using darknet for detection of botnet was used by researchers
in the John Hopkins University. Their work involved measuring botnet traffic, in the size
of hundreds to thousands. Their findings revealed botnets are a major contributor to the
overall unwanted traffic on the Internet. They confirmed that although the scan generated
by botnet are primarily to recruit new victims, the behavior is markedly different from
autonomous malware, worms, because of its manual orchestration. They also discovered
that IRC remain to be the dominant protocol for C&C communication [8].
A lot of the work done has been to quantify the size of botnets, the growth, and their
behavior. In the context of our work, the main objective is to apply darknet technique to
accurately detect bots and network-borne malware and eventually confirm via live forensics
the type of infection on the affected hosts in a campus wide network. As such the darknet
is ideally deployed in a LAN environment to enable verification of hosts to be conducted.
This will also provide insight on the effectiveness of security controls within the campus
wide network and the computers in defending against bot and network-borne malware.
The specific objectives of this project are to: a) passively identify infected computers in
the network; b) analyse the types of botnets that are infecting the computers in the campus;
c) identify the attack vector or how the bot penetrated into the host or computer, if possible;
d) identify the source of the bot or malware, if possible; e) provide recommendations on
countermeasures against future attacks.
4.4 Our Approach and Implementation
Monitoring all traffic within a large-scale network to track compromised computer
client and malicious traffic requires a lot of resources; Intruder Detection System (IDS)
(with packet processing capability to carry out packet capture and analysis) as well as
large capacity of storage. Once the data are captured, there is an issue on the preserving
of confidentiality of the information, which may contain legitimate traffic with sensitive
information such as passwords.
On the other hand, the above issues are not present in the Darknetimplementation.
Darknet involves capturing and monitoring traffic communication to unused IP Addresses.
Darknet is a portion of routed, allocated IP space in which no active services or servers
reside. Any packet that enters a Darknet is by its presence aberrant because no legitimate
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Fig. 4.2 Network diagram
packet should be sent to a Darknet. Such packets may have arrived by mistake or wrong
configuration, but the majority of such types of packets are sent by malware.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the network used for the implementation and analysis of this
research. The network consists of two parts with a /24 mask. We chose to have one of
the /24 network to be assigned to a Darknet 1, while another ten IP Address is assigned to
Darknet 2. The Darknet 2 is part of IP range within a computing lab, that is used actively
on daily basis. A sensor server is setup with 2 network interfaces, one to passively capture
packets destined to the darknet, while the other network interface is used for administrative
access to the sensor from the management console. In order to have any traffic destined to
the Darknet, diverted to the sensor, the router needs to be configured to send all Darknet
prefix traffic to the Darknet Sensor interface.
outer#conf t
router(config)# ip route 10.X.136.0 255.255.255.0 10.X.1.2
router(config)# ^Z
router# wr
The sensor requires a separate network interface for the management console access
primarily to prevent poisoning the Darknet with legitimate traffic. The setup immediately
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generated records showing network traffic activity entering the Darknet from various in-
ternal hosts. Further analysis was done on the infected computer to identify the type of
malware as well as other security controls present in the system.
4.5 Experimental Results and Analysis
After appropriate configurations of all necessary parts of our network, data were col-
lected from the Darknet throughout a one month period. This implementation produced
very significant results. In this section, we will discuss in our findings.
Upon analysis of the data, a few anomalous network traffic communications can be
observed on destination port 445 and ICMP.
Fig. 4.3 Time series of SYN packets of port 445
Based on the data obtained at the sensor server, which can consists of any sniffer based
technology such as tcpdump, all the ICMP communication sent to the Darknet are identified
as echo requests. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the network communication to port 445 and
ICMP. As shown in the Figure 4.3, the network activities were decreasing in the middle of
the month which is due to the mid-semester break and other vacation period. Therefore,
most computer clients were not active during those times. However, the network activities
began to increase after the semester vacation.
Network Forensics: Detection and Mitigation of Botnet and Malicious Code via Darknet 71
Fig. 4.4 Time series of incoming ICMP packet
Referring to the Figure 4.4, the ICMP traffic shows similar pattern as port 445 network
activities, in which low network activities were observed in the middle of the month due
to the fact that most of the computers remained turned off during the semester breaks. The
network activities began to increase again after the semester breaks.
4.5.1 Further Analysis on Destination Port 445 Traffic
Destination port 445/TCP is commonly used and assigned for Microsoft-DS Active Di-
rectory and Windows shares. Thus, this port is to be used when the organization is using
Microsoft Domain Service Active Directory and Windows File Sharing [9, 10]. However,
all identified computer clients were not using Microsoft Domain Service Active Directory
and had insignificant usage of Windows File Sharing. Each computer suspected to be in-
fected with malwares sent 20 TCP SYN requests of size 64 bytes to each unique destination
IP address as shown in Figure 4.5.
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Fig. 4.5 TCP/445 probes summary generated by host 10.x.128.103
4.5.2 Further Analysis on ICMP traffic
The ICMP echo requests (commonly known as “ping”) are used primarily for trou-
bleshooting network connection. Most Internet gateways now block incoming echo re-
quests in order to avoid Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) [11] attacks. Historically,
several malwares that propagate via ICMP echo request include Nachi worm [12]. The
collected data indicate that each infected host generated only a single ping probe to each
sequence of unique IP, as shown in Figure 4.6. This indicates ping sweep, not ping flood.
Ping sweep would be relevant for the purpose of determining whether the host is alive or
not.
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Fig. 4.6 Summary of ICMP Echo Request generated by host 10.x.125.34
4.5.3 Analysis of Suspected Client
Four of the suspected (infected) computers were selected for our analysis. The selection
was mainly based on the ability to gain physical access to the computers within the dura-
tion of the project. Table 4.1 shows the information gathered pertaining to the suspected
computers that were analyzed. One of the hosts had most recent updated antivirus signa-
ture, while three other hosts had the antivirus signature outdated, and in which one of them
apparently has the license expired. All four hosts sampled, were running on Windows XP.
Table 4.1 Selected Computer System’s Information
Client No / System
Info
Client 1 Client 2 Client 3 Client 4
Operating System
MS Windows
XP SP 2
MS Windows
XP SP 2
MS Windows
XP SP 3
MS Windows
XP SP 3
Antivirus Name and
Signature Status
eScan -
outdated
eScan -
outdated
Avira -
recently
updated
Avira -
outdated and
license
expired
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Further analysis was conducted on each host via live forensics, using tools such as
Sysinternals Suite [13] as well as other standard tools such as Netstat [14]. The investigation
revealed that the hosts were not only infected with multiple malwares but also they were
actively establishing connection to foreign hosts in the Internet. Based on the analysis of
the reputation of the foreign hosts’ IP addresses, they wereconfirmed to be rated high risk
and minimal risk, as well as reputed to be malicious C&C and Backdoor Trojan sites. The
host running the antivirus with recently updated signature was found to be infected with the
Conficker malware [15] as well as possibly Autoit malware [16], while the IP Address of
the remote host in Hong Kong is reputed as High Risk. The acquired information is shown
in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Suspected Client System’s Information 2
Client No Client 1 Client 2
Malware
Detected
Conficker, Mabezat,
IRC Trojan Backdoor
Conficker, Mabezat,
IRC Trojan Backdoor,
Trojan Dropper, Sality
Foreign
Addresses -
Reputation
149.9.1.16 Minimal Risk -
IRC Server
(TrustedSource)
C&C
(Emerging
Thread)
85.25.176.33 High Risk
(TrustedSource)
74.208.64.145 High Risk -
Malicious Sites,
Phishing (TrustedSource)
IRC Trojan Backdoor
(ThreatExpert)
89.149.227.194 High Risk -
Malicious Sites
Sality Virus
(ThreatExpert)
87.106.24.200 High Risk -
SmartFilter Category:
Malicious Sites,
Phishing (TrustedSource)
IRC Trojan Backdoor
(ThreatExpert)
Network Forensics: Detection and Mitigation of Botnet and Malicious Code via Darknet 75
Client No Client 3 Client 4
Malware
Detected
Conficker, Autoit Autoit
Foreign
Addresses
with Bad
Reputation
110.44.0.50 High Risk -
Malicious Sites
(TrustedSource)
204.12.222.155 Minimal Risk -
Not Categorized
(TrustedSource)
Autoit
(ThreadExpert)
McAfee R© TrustedSourceTM is a global threat correlation engine and intelligence base of global mes-
saging and communication behavior, including reputation volume, and trends, including email, web
traffic and malware. Refer to http://www.trustedsource.org/ ThreatExpert is an advanced
automated threat analysis system designed to analyze and report the behavior of computer viruses,
worms, trojans, adware, spyware, and other security-related risks in a fully automated mode. Refer
tohttp://www.threatexpert.com/
Figure 4.7 illustrates how the botnets propagate within the campus wide network (based
on the findings). The computer was confirmed to be infected with IRC Trojan backdoor and
Conficker worm. They were scanning the LAN network for other vulnerable computers.
Fig. 4.7 Botnet attack on a campus network
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Despite having perimeter defence which included the firewall, the infected hosts were
able to establish outgoing connection to unauthorized external hosts, due to the lack for
policy enforcement for outgoing traffic. The internal scanning activity generated by the
infected host also caused unnecessary utilization of the bandwidth.
4.6 Future Work
There are several areas in which this research can contribute. In addressing operational
level security, an organization requires sufficient skilled manpower to effectively apply
enforcement measures at the system and network level. The use of remote management
system will enable real-time alerts and integration to other application and systems that
can enforce more restrictive policies. The Darknet can be integrated with Walled Garden
method [17] to isolate the infected computer. The system can also be integrated with IPS
to prevent unauthorized outgoing traffic from infected hosts. A graphical interface or dash-
board can be integrated to provide visual status of malicious network activities. The use of
Darknet is one practical solution, which requires low amount of resources to process the
gathered data.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
The study identified a total of 31 computers suspected to be infected with malwares
and 4 of them were proven to be infected by malwares; mainly Conficker which had caused
high network traffic to destination port 445 and Autoit malware contributed high ICMP
network traffic. This further confirms that high amount of ICMP traffic generally indicates
a virus [18]. Using the Darknet, small amount of captured anomalous data were sufficient
to elevate the attention to the problem. There was no need to sift through legitimate data to
identify anomalous traffic.
Based on the analysis of our work, it can be concluded that the security controls at
network and host level at certain segments of the network are insufficient and not effectively
protecting the campus wide network from malware and bot propagation and infection. We
present our recommendations to deal with this issue which we believe will be useful for
similar settings.
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